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argaret Moore’s A Political Theory of Territory is arguably 
the most erudite treatment of territorial rights on the 
market.1 Considering that territorial rights are a very 
relevant and prevalent topic in contemporary political theory, 
with a fast-growing and increasingly sophisticated body of 
literature, this is no mean achievement. I expect this book will 
become the reference point for all future publications on 
territorial rights for many years to come, and rightly so. 
The premise of Moore’s book is that the concept of ‘territory’ 
is under-theorized in contemporary political philosophy. She is 
right, and in this book Moore gives a very thorough analysis of 
why political theory needs to take territory seriously.  More 
specifically Moore puts forward a moral and political theory of 
territory centred on the idea of self-determination, characterized 
by two moral rights: a moral right to residency (individual) and a 
moral right to occupancy (collective). 
I want to take issue with two different aspects of Moore’s 
treatise, on the subject of rights and the question of corrective 
!
1 Margaret Moore, A Political Theory of Territory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015). Unless otherwise specified, all page or section numbers refer to 
this work. 
M 
Philosophy and Public Issues – People and Territory 
 108!
justice. First, why does Moore assume that moral and political 
concerns about territory are disputes about ‘rights’? In other 
words, notwithstanding the fact that it has become prevalent in 
the literature to talk about ‘territorial rights’, does a political 
theory of territory need to be formulated in the language of 
rights? And if so, what are the requirements of a theory of 
territorial rights? Secondly, Moore’s assumption that territory 
raises political and moral issues that are best understood in terms 
of ‘rights’ has implications for the way we understand and address 
questions of historical injustice. Moore deserves to be praised not 
only for putting forward an elegant and convincing abstract 
theory of territorial rights, but also for suggesting how this theory 
can guide us in resolving extremely complex and morally 
challenging practical dilemmas. Nevertheless, there is the 
suspicion that her theoretical framework, grounded on a theory 
of rights, distorts the injustice of historical wrongs, and 
consequently misrepresents the best way to correct such wrongs.  
 
I 
The Right to a Territory? 
Our relationship with a territory is morally significant, but do 
we have a right to a territory? Moore thinks so. She is not alone in 
this regard of course, in fact the majority of authors in political 
theory writing about territory often assume that this is part of a 
larger discourse on rights: the received opinion is that ‘terriorial’ 
and ‘rights’ are a natural combination, they are meant for each 
other, like Ben and Jerry, or fish and chips.2 Security in numbers 
!
2 For an overview on ‘territorial rights’, see D. Miller, “Territorial Rights: 
Concept and Justification,” Political Studies, Vol. 60, no. 2 (2012): pp. 252–268; 
T. Meisels, Territorial Rights (Dordrecht: Springer 2009); A. J. Simmons, “On 
the Territorial Rights of States,” Philosophical Issues Vol. 11, no. 1 (2001): pp. 
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is a rational strategy, but the issue will not go away. Why 
territorial rights? Why rights? Why not territorial justice, or 
territorial morality? It seems to me that if we assume that 
territorial concerns are best understood as rights issues, then we 
need a fully comprehensive theory of rights.  
It is surprising, and perhaps slightly disappointing, that a 
detailed analysis of rights is missing from Moore’s otherwise 
careful and in-depth theoretical framework. Instead Moore deals 
with a number of pivotal but complex issues in a set of footnotes, 
touching on the nature of rights and the way to resolve the 
inevitable conflict of rights. I’m going to suggest that this is not 
sufficient; furthermore what she presents us with is not always 
persuasive. 
At the outset of her treatise Moore  tells us that “Everyone has 
an interest in land, and this general interest is important to 
grounding rights to it” (p. 9). Moore goes on to reiterate this 
message even more emphatically on the next page: 
In this book, I argue that people have an important interest in access to 
land that supports the way of life that is fundamental to their projects and 
identities, the place where they live and have relationships, the geographical 
domain of their self-determination, and the property that they hold, and 
that these interests are sufficiently important to be protected by right and 
hold others under obligations to protect or promote those rights (p. 10). 
On the bases of these claims, it would appear that the logical 
structure of Moore’s main argument unfolds along the following 
lines: 
P1 There is value in collective self-determination. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
300–326; A. Stilz, “Why do States have Territorial Rights?”, International Theory 
Vol. 1, no. 2 (2009): pp. 185–213.  
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P2 There are normatively significant relationships between 
peoples and places (projects; identities; attachments; etc.). 
P3 Self-determination (P1), residency and occupation (P2) 
constitute ‘morally important human interests’. 
P4 ‘Morally important human interests’ generate rights. 
Therefore: 
C1 We have territorial rights to protect our self-
determination, residency, and occupation. 
Clearly Moore is endorsing an interest theory of rights, which 
has notable advantages, but also some well-known complications. 
I’ll return to Moore’s interest theory of rights later, but first the 
logical structure of her argument requires closer inspection. 
Premises P1, P2 and P3 are not sufficient to justify C1. Even if 
we give Moore the benefit of the doubt and accept her views on 
the nature and importance of self-determination, residency and 
occupation, the move from acknowledging that there are special 
interests attached to territory to recognizing territorial rights is 
suspicious. The only way that Moore can make C1 follows from 
P1, P2, and P3 is by including another premise, P4: the 
assumption that rights are derived from ‘morally important 
human interests’. In what follows I’m going to suggest that P4 is 
the weak link in Moore’s argument. 
No one denies that there are special interests attached to 
territory, but special interests don’t automatically translate into 
rights. The special interest that we are told generates from our 
relationship with a territory is, perhaps, an argument for making 
territory a question of justice. But Moore is not defending a 
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theory of territorial justice, but a theory of territorial rights.3 The 
reason why it is tempting but logically illegitimate to move too 
quickly from ‘interests’ to ‘rights’ is captured by Joseph Raz in his 
critique of what he refers to as ‘traditional’ accounts of human 
rights,4 in particular those put forward by Alan Gewirth and 
James Griffin: 
Traditional theories fail for several reasons. ….here I will point to three 
problems. They misconceive the relations between value and rights. They 
overreach, trying to derive rights which they cannot derive. And they fail 
either to illuminate or to criticize the existing human rights practice 
The first point he raises is crucial for us: misconceiving the 
relations between value and rights. Raz criticizes Gewirth for 
“ignoring the possibility of believing that certain condition are 
essential to our life, and even of striving to secure such 
conditions, without either claiming or having a right to them.”5 
Raz returns on this point in his critique of Griffin, who like 
Gewirth fails to show that value establishes rights. The fact that 
something is of value to us is not sufficient to attract the special 
protection of rights, since as Raz: “By that argument if the love of 
my children is the most important thing to me then I have a right 
to it.”6 
!
3 Of course some political theorists would argue that justice is fundamentally 
about rights. For example a left-libertarian like Hillel Steiner argues that rights 
are the basic blocks of a theory of social justice, but he is appealing to a right 
to self-ownership, and of course he embraces a will (or choice) theory of 
rights, and not an interest theory of rights, like Moore. 
4 J. Raz, “Human Rights Without Foundations,” in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas 
(eds.), Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 
pp. 323-324. 
5 Ibid., p. 324. 
6 Ibid., p. 325. 
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A critique along similar lines applies also to Moore: she simply 
assumes that something being valuable, or in her language a 
‘morally important human interest’, is enough to turn it into a 
right.7 But it’s not necessarily so: the fact that territories are 
necessary for our collective self-determination, and that there is 
value in self-determination, is per se not sufficient to establish a 
right to a territory. 
Translating what is deemed to be valuable to a right is a 
common move amongst interest theories of rights. In her book 
Moore appeals to what she calls a ‘modified’ interest-theory of 
rights. In Chapter 2 Moore explains what she means by this in a 
footnote:  
I rely on a modified interest-theory of rights, which combines the idea of 
wrong or disrespect to the equal moral status of the right-holder with the 
idea of damage or harm to important interests of the right-holder. It is a 
modified interest theory, because I am persuaded that that an account rooted 
only in welfare fails to account for the trumping character of rights (p. 32, 
fn. 31). 
Moore is right to ‘modify’ the interest theory of rights, but this 
may not be enough. There are potentially three problems with 
Moore’s ‘modified’ interest-theory of rights, and therefore three 
reasons why it remains problematic to assign rights on the basis 
of our territorial interests. I will refer to these as the inflationary 
problem, the conflict problem, and the instrumentalization 
problem. 
!
7 The language used by Moore and Griffin is very similar. While Moore talks 
about ‘morally important human interest’, Griffin appeals to ‘especially 
important human interests’: “It is only because they [autonomy and liberty] are 
especially important interests that rights can be derived from them; rights are 
strong protections, and so require something especially valuable to attract 
protection.” J. Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2008), p. 35. 
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1.1. The Inflationary Problem 
One area of concern is that Moore’s modified interest-theory 
simply generates even more right claims, which contributes to the 
inflationary trend that has seen every political claim, every moral 
argument, every policy, being justified in terms of ‘a right’. The 
Inflationary Problem in rights discourse is well documented, and 
it applies especially to entitlement theories of rights such as H.J. 
McCloskey’s, but also to interest theories of rights. Regarding the 
entitlement theory, James Nickel warns us that if a moral right 
exists whenever there are strong moral reasons for ensuring the 
availability of a certain good, “the list of entitlements will be 
nearly as long as the list of morally valuable goods … this 
conception has no built-in assurance that the demand side of 
rights will not outrun the supply side.”8 
Joseph Raz is also aware of the inflationary tendency within 
rights discourse: “An ever-growing number of rights are claimed 
to be human rights, for example, the right to sexual pleasure; the 
right to sexual information based upon scientific inquiry; the right 
to comprehensive sexual education. It is declared that all persons 
have the right to a secure, healthy, and ecologically sound 
environment. Future generations have rights to equitably meet 
their needs. All persons have the right to protection of the air, 
soil, water, sea-ice, flora and fauna…. Some academics argue that 
there is a human right to globalization.”9 To this expanding list of 
rights Moore wants to add territorial rights. The issue is not that 
we don’t have sexual rights, or that we don’t have a right to an 
ecologically sound environment. In fact we may even have 
territorial rights. But what we need is a theory which clearly 
indicate what rights we have, and why. Simply adding to the list is 
almost too easy.  
!
8 J. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (Oxford: Blackwell 2007), p. 30. 
9 J. Raz, “Human Rights Without Foundations,” p. 322. 
Philosophy and Public Issues – People and Territory 
 114!
The problem being of course that the currency of rights loses 
value the more widespread it is used. Admittedly this is a bigger 
problem for the literature on ‘human rights’, but since the line 
between a ‘right’ and a ‘human right’ is somewhat blurry, and 
Moore switches freely between talking about territory as a 
political right and a moral right, people would be forgiven for 
thinking that perhaps territorial rights are not just legal rights but 
also human rights. In fact, her thesis on self-determination is a 
perfect complement to, for example, Griffin’s interest theory of 
human rights grounded on the concept of personhood, which he 
defines in terms of autonomy and normative agency. 
 
1.2. The Conflict of Rights Problem 
Related to the Inflationary Problem is a second problem, 
namely, that as we create more rights based on important 
interests, we increase the inevitable risk of rights (and duties) 
coming into conflict. How to resolve conflicts of rights has 
always been a thorn on the side of interest theories of rights, and 
Moore is fully aware of it: 
I treat rights as possessing moral stringency in the sense that they generally 
override competing moral (welfarist) considerations. … However, rights 
may conflict (or more precisely the duties generated by a right may 
conflict). This is hardly surprising: if the interest is sufficiently morally 
important to ground a right, it will give rise not to a single corresponding 
duty but to a number of duties” (32, fn. 32).  
From this statement we can deduce that according to Moore 
territorial rights are, in Hohfeldian terms, claim rights and not 
privilege or liberty rights, since they are correlated with a number 
of duties. It would also appear that Moore is fully aware of the 
problem of dealing with conflict of rights. There are many 
different ways of dealing with this problem. In another footnote, 
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Moore (pp. 32-33, fn. 33) considers giving rights lexical priority, 
but she dismisses this strategy on the grounds that we cannot 
assess trade-offs between rights along a single metric. Moore is 
probably right, but the problem still stands: how do we resolve 
conflicts of rights? 
Moore solution is the following. She argues that rights have to 
meet two criteria: they have to be feasible, and they have to be 
compatible. By ‘feasible’ Moore means that they cannot be 
impossible, while the ‘compatibility’ requirement is explained in 
the following terms:  
What do I mean by the compatibility requirement? I mean that the right 
should be defined in such a way that it does not come into necessary 
conflict with other fundamental rights, which also identify and protect 
fundamental human interests (p. 29). 
This is ingenious, but I’m not convinced this is going to work, 
at least not for Moore. The compatibility requirement may be an 
option for choice or will theory of rights—this is what Hillel 
Steiner refers to as the condition of compossibility, a term he 
borrows from Leibniz—but not the interest theory of rights, not 
even the ‘modified’ theory of rights.  
It is very attractive to appeal to the discourse of rights, and a 
theory of ‘territorial rights’ has a more urgent and authoritative 
appeal than ‘territorial justice’ or ‘territorial principles’ or 
‘territorial doctrines’. But theories of rights are messy, and merely 
adding ‘territory’ to the existing list of rights creates more 
problems than it solves. If Moore is serious about people having 
a moral right to territorial occupancy and residency, she needs to 
tell us how her theory of rights works: Are territorial rights claim 
rights or liberty rights? If they are claim rights who is under a 
duty to provide the right-holder with her rights? When does an 
interest generate a right and when does it not generate a right? 
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Should we be concerned with the inflationary tendency of rights? 
And crucially how do we resolve conflicts between rights and 
between duties? These are complex issues, which cannot be dealt 
with in a series of footnotes. 
 
1.3. The Instrumentalization Problem 
There is a third potential problem with Moore theory of 
territorial rights, namely, the Instrumentalization Problem. 
‘Rights’ are powerful tools, both conceptually and rhetorically. 
Being on the side of rights makes one’s argument not only 
stronger, but also correct from a normative perspective. Those 
who champion rights claim to have morality on their side, which 
is not insignificant. But rights discourses can also be incendiary, 
and even engender intolerance. 
In Chapter 2 Moore tells us that territorial rights are not 
absolute rights: “In all cases, however, I regard these rights not as 
absolute claims, but as subject to certain limitations” (p. 29). 
Moore is right of course, indeed this is a standard view held by 
most authors writing about rights, including human rights. For 
example Nickel reminds us that “human rights are high priority 
norms. They are not absolute but are strong enough to win most 
of the time when they compete with other considerations.”10 
One potential problem with the language of ‘territorial rights’ 
is that political actors who demand and fight for their territorial 
rights often choose to assume that rights are absolute. This is to 
be expected of course, since political actors are in the business of 
promoting their interests at all costs. The Instrumentalization 
Problem arises when people start to appeal to self-determination 
and territorial rights in order to justify territorial wars. In other 
!
10 J. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, p. 9. 
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words, there is the risk that unscrupulous politicians and activists 
use the language of territorial rights to justify territorial gains and 
territorial wars. Perhaps political theorists need to be more 
cautious before using certain terms.   
It is of course tempting to dismiss this concern, on the 
grounds that we cannot take issue with philosophers if people 
make improper use of philosophical ideas. Be that as it may, in 
Ch.7 of her book Moore discusses the idea of the acquisition (and 
diminution) of residency or occupancy rights and the related right 
of return, in terms of ‘legitimate expectation’. This suggests that 
perhaps she is aware of the Instrumentalization Problem, or at 
the very least she realizes that she needs to specify what the 
‘certain limitations’ are which makes territorial rights not an 
absolute claim. But what exactly are those ‘legitimate 
expectations’? According to Moore, “[it] means something like 
‘what it is reasonable to expect to happen’” (p. 146). This is an 
interesting claim, and a good starting point, but per se it doesn’t 
go far enough. First of all it may be necessary to distinguish 
‘legitimate expectations’ from ‘rational expectations’, and 
secondly the term ‘legitimate’ requires detailed analysis. It is not 
enough to replace ‘legitimate’ with ‘reasonable’, since the concept 
of ‘reasonableness’ is doing a lot of work here, but it is a famously 
opaque and obscure concept, perhaps even more so than the 
term ‘legitimate’.11 One thing is certain:  when it comes to 
territorial politics, people have all sorts of ‘illegitimate 
expectations’, sometimes driven by questionable motives 
(vengeance or revenge or retribution), sometimes driven by thinly 
disguised self-interest (access to natural resources), and only 
occasionally in good faith.  
!
11 For example, it is not clear to me whether Moore is using ‘reasonable’ in the 
Rawlsian or Scanlonian sense of the term. For an analysis of ‘reasonableness’ 
see V. Bufacchi, “Reasonable Agreement,” Imprints, Vol. 2, No.3 (1998). 
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II 
Territorial Rights and Historical Injustice 
Moore deals with issues of historical injustice in Chapter 7. As 
historical injustice is a complex issue, understandably Moore  
points out that in this chapter she does not deal with all kinds of 
corrective justice, but “just on corrective justice with respect to 
land, and even then, not all kinds of corrective justice … the 
moral wrongs involved in the taking of land are certainly worth 
theorizing” (p. 140). She is right; the moral wrongs involved in 
the taking of land are certainly worth theorizing, and we need a 
political theory of territory to do so, and Moore provides us with 
the tools to do just that. But what is peculiar about her theory is 
that she does not seem to be concerned about the acts of 
violence involved in the taking of territory, instead she is 
concerned about the specific good that is being taken: land and 
territory. It follows that according to Moore colonialism is wrong 
because the process of unlawfully and illegitimately taking of land 
disrupts our social attachments, and in the process undermines 
our self-determination: 
Most people think that the wrong of colonialism isn’t captured just by the 
fact that the imperial authorities failed to include the colonial peoples fully 
in their political projects, and instead erected forms of political and legal 
domination over them…. This was part of the problem, to be sure, but we 
also think that a significant part of the problem was that the imperial 
powers were involved in the taking of territory … The problem with 
colonialism wasn’t simply the violation of the equality condition (equal 
treatment of persons); it was that the imperial power was engaged in taking 
territorial rights from another people, through extending political authority 
(rules of justice) over them (p. 100). 
Moore returns on this point in a footnote in Chapter 7, where 
she explains exactly why the violation of territorial rights is 
wrong: “I am using the term ‘imperialism’ to refer to a situation 
where one group occupies the land of another, thereby violating 
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their territorial rights, and also subjugates them, thereby denying 
them the capacity to be self-determining” (p. 160, fn.4).  
There are valid reasons why Moore uses the lenses of 
territorial rights in order to make sense of the historical injustice 
of colonialism, especially as it highlights certain aspects of the 
horrors and wrongness of colonialism, yet in the process of 
stressing why territorial issues are crucial to an understanding of 
the evils of colonialism Moore risks to downplay other important 
aspects, to the point where those other evils of colonialism are 
left out of the equation altogether. In other words, the starting 
point of Moore’s analysis is to lament the fact that territory is 
under-theorized, but in her effort to put territory at the forefront 
of our analysis she ends up under-theorizing the violence of 
colonialism. So while what Moore is saying is not wrong, it is 
surprising how the violence that accompanies colonialism is not 
even mentioned. 
The only place where the violence of colonialism is remarked 
on by Moore is in the following passage:  
We can identify at least four sorts of potential wrongs involved when land 
is taken, primarily through expelling people from their homes and 
communities, in addition to the coercion that usually accompanies such 
events: (1) being deprived of individual rights of residency; (2) being denied 
group rights of occupancy; (3) being denied collective self-determination; 
and (4) having individual or collective property rights violated (p. 140). 
What is worrying about this passage is the way Moore deals 
with the abhorrent violence of colonialism. Moore merely 
touches on the ‘coercion that usually accompanies’ colonialism 
and imperialism, before leaving this issue aside and never 
returning to it. She goes on to consider what should be done to 
remedy territorial rights violation, as if that is the main issue to be 
confronted. The fact that the violence of colonialism plays a 
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minor role in Moore’s argument about the wrongful taking of 
land and territory is not inconsequential: not taking violence 
seriously is potentially problematic because it distorts the way we 
think about corrective measures. 
This is what Moore says about corrective justice:  
Most theorists writing in the corrective justice tradition distinguish between 
three different mechanisms for correcting historical injustice: restitution, 
giving back whatever it is that has been unjustly taken; compensation, giving 
something of a certain value but not the thing itself, either because 
restitution is impossible or in addition to restitution to make good the loss 
the victim has suffered meanwhile; and apology, again either because 
restitution is not possible or because there is independent reason to 
acknowledge the wrong even if it is. All of these can apply when land is 
taken, and which remedy is appropriate depends on identifying which 
particular rights are violated, and the justificatory arguments for the rights 
(p. 139-140). 
Because of her preoccupation with self-determination, 
grounded on attachment to a specific piece of land and territory, 
it is perhaps to be expected that the way Moore thinks of 
corrective justice is in terms of identifying and rectifying specific 
rights violations, associated with territorial rights. But prioritising 
a moral discourse centred on the idea of territory and the rights 
to occupancy and residence come at a cost, as it demotes other 
moral considerations, and other ways of thinking about corrective 
justice. It is one thing to put forward a political theory of 
territory, but quite another to be monistic about territorial rights 
and expect to explain most things through the lenses of this one 
theory. 
Moore argues that the right to return to the land from which 
you were unjustly expelled is not eternal, but has time-limits. This 
is in order not to fall foul of the first-occupancy principle. This is 
probably correct, which is why sometimes an apology is as much 
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as one can hope for, and that in any case an apology can go a 
long way to heal a wound. But what matters here is the reason for 
the apology, or in other words what it is we are apologizing for. 
Given the appalling violence that accompanies colonization, I’m 
not convinced that apologizing for the violation of a territorial 
right is the issue here. 
Consider the following hypothetical scenario:  
The Case of the Apology: The colonial power known as Engerland colonized 
Eireland for many centuries, using brutal violence, reducing the local 
population to dire poverty, occupying their territory, and expelling the 
people of Eireland from their ancestral land. Engerland now argues that 
while they acknowledge that what their ancestors did many centuries 
before was wrong, too much time has passed for the people of Eireland to 
return to the land that was wrongly taken from them. All Engerland can do 
now is to issue a formal apology for the historical wrong associated with a 
violation of territorial rights. 
There is something deeply problematic about this scenario, 
and yet it is consistent with Moore’s political theory of territorial 
rights, and in particular with her views on corrective justice. It 
would be consistent with Moore’s theory to suggest that it is not 
the barbarity of the oppression, the arbitrary nature of the 
violence, the physical and psychological disintegration of many 
generations, but the violation of a right to a piece of land that is 
the reason for an apology. This strikes me as counterintuitive. 
Yes, our relationship with place is morally significant, and it has 
value, but we don’t have a right to everything we find valuable, 
and it does not mean that corrective justice regarding land should 
focus exclusively, or even primarily, on territorial rights. 
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III 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have raised two issues with Moore’s political 
theory of territory, dealing with a fundamental assumption in her 
argument. First, I argued that even if we give Moore the benefit 
of the doubt in terms of recognizing our special important 
interest in self-determination, and in accepting that territory is 
crucial for our self-determination, both as individuals and as 
groups, we must not assume that the fact that territory is valuable 
to us automatically translate into the language of rights. The 
relationship between ‘value’ and ‘rights’ is perhaps misconceived, 
to use Raz’s language, and one cannot move from one to the 
other as quickly as Moore does. Therefore even though it is 
common practice to talk and write about ‘territorial rights’, this 
concept is fundamentally problematic, since introducing ‘rights’ in 
this moral equation only complicates matters: the more we use 
the language of rights the more rights are devalued, we also 
introduce more conflict of rights which we don’t know how to 
resolve, and finally we generate ‘legitimate expectations’ about 
territorial rights, even though we don’t necessarily know what 
these amount to. Secondly, I argued that putting too much 
emphasis on territorial rights could potentially distort our views 
on historical injustice, and how this is to be corrected. 
Notwithstanding my reservations, Moore has written the sort 
of book that deserves the widest possible readership: this book 
belongs to that small minority of academic publications that 
simply cannot and should not go unnoticed. Moore deserves the 
highest praise for the accomplished scholarship that informs 
every twist in her argument in every page of an ambitious tome 
that explores both the theory and practise of one of the most 
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fascinating but controversial issues in political theory (and 
international politics) today. 
 
University College Cork 
If you need to cite this article, please use the following format: 
 
Bufacchi, Vittorio, “Territory, Rights and Historical Justice,” Philosophy and Public 
Issues (New Series), Vol. 6, No. 2 (2016), 107-123, edited by S. Maffettone, G. 
Pellegrino and M. Bocchiola 
